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Resilience can be understood as the property of an object or system to recover from its state of 
disruption back to its complete functional stage as it was prior to the disruption event. There are 
different ways of measuring the resilience of a system and tracking the system performance is one 
of the methods. Thus, measuring the time taken by the system to recover to its original state is one 
of the parameters that can be considered. In this research work, we have focused on building a 
model(s) that predicts the time taken for an interdependent network to recover and function at 
100%. In order to implement this idea, we present a case-study of the system of interdependent 
water, gas, and power utilities in Shelby County, TN. The model is trained using the train data set 
from the data set generated by running the optimization code multiple times and observing the 
time taken for the inter-dependent network to recover completely. The prediction of time to recover 
is made on the test data set using different models and the results are then compared.  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgement ......................................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... v 
List of figures ................................................................................................................................ vii 
List of tables ................................................................................................................................. viii 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Resilience ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Objective ............................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Workflow .............................................................................................................................. 2 
2. Background ................................................................................................................................. 4 
3. Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 5 
3.1. Optimization code ................................................................................................................ 5 
3.1.1. Network description and representation ........................................................................ 5 
3.1.2. Model assumptions ...................................................................................................... 11 
3.1.3. Notation ....................................................................................................................... 11 
3.1.4 Objective function ........................................................................................................ 13 
3.1.6. Restoration Level ......................................................................................................... 14 
3.2 Data generation ................................................................................................................... 21 
3.2.1 Understanding the data of Approach I .......................................................................... 21 
3.2.2 Addition of features, extension of Approach I ............................................................. 26 
3.2.3 Approach II ................................................................................................................... 26 
3.2.4 Limitations .................................................................................................................... 28 
3.3 Predictive modelling ........................................................................................................... 28 
4. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 30 
4.1 Discussion of approach I ..................................................................................................... 30 
4.2 Discussion of approach II .................................................................................................... 32 
4.3 Comparison of approach I & II ........................................................................................... 33 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 33 
6. Future scope .............................................................................................................................. 36 
7. References ................................................................................................................................. 37 
vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. System performance across system states (adapted from Henry and Ramirez-Marquez 
(2012))............................................................................................................................................. 2 
Figure 2. General depiction of the (a) water, (b) gas, and (c) power networks, and (d) the 
interdependency among networks in Shelby County, TN (adapted from González et al. (2016)). 6 
Figure 3. Water network with 49 nodes and 71 links. .................................................................... 8 
Figure 4. Gas network with 16 nodes and 17 links. ........................................................................ 9 
Figure 5. Power network with 60 nodes and 76 links. .................................................................. 10 
Figure 6. Histograms of number of nodes attacked for a) water, b) gas, c) power networks and d) 
the whole network. ........................................................................................................................ 24 
Figure 7. Screenshot of one of the frames of the GIF created for the power network. ................ 25 
Figure 8. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and 
Decision Tree for the original data. .............................................................................................. 31 
Figure 9. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and 
Decision Tree after the addition of the four features. ................................................................... 31 
Figure 10. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. General formation of the water, gas, and power networks components in Shelby County, 
TN. (adapted from (Ghorbani Renani et al., 2019)) ....................................................................... 7 
Table 2. Model parameters. .......................................................................................................... 12 
Table 3. Model decision variables. ............................................................................................... 12 
Table 4. Template of the data generated from the optimization code. ......................................... 21 
Table 5. An extract of the data generated with the status of the nodes......................................... 22 
Table 6. An extract of the data generated with restoration rates along with the target value, time, 
in seconds. ..................................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 7. An extract of the dataset after formatting. ...................................................................... 27 
Table 8. Comparison of RMSE and correlation for Random Forest model. ................................ 30 







While our dependence on infrastructure systems such as electric power, water supply, and 
telecommunication networks continues to grow along with their dependence on each other, recent 
natural disasters and malevolent attacks have demonstrated how a single event can cripple such 
networks and the community that relies on them for an extended period (Ouyang, 2014). Due to 
the substantial economic and social impacts of disruptions to such interdependent infrastructure 
systems, ensuring their resilience is a major concern (Kettl, 2013) as even small disruptions can 
lead to substantial failures in such an interconnected system (Danziger et al., 2016; Eusgeld et al., 
2011; Wu et al., 2016). 
The concept of resilience has been quantified with various measures in different domains (Hosseini 
et al., 2016). In this work, we adopt a resilience paradigm based on the system performance across 
system states illustrated in Figure 1, adapted from Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012). In this 
model, the resilience measure is defined by two primary dimensions: vulnerability, or the drop in 
the performance after a disruptive event, 𝑒, and recoverability, or the timely restoration of the 
system performance to the desired level. From this model, resilience is quantified as the ratio of 
recovery at time 𝑡 to loss noted by Я𝜑(𝑡|𝑒). Network performance at time 𝑡 is represented with 





Figure 1. System performance across system states (adapted from Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012)). 
 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this research is to predict ( using different predictive techniques and compare) the 
time taken (in seconds) for an interdependent network to recover completely from an instance of 
interdiction of a set of randomly selected nodes, given the optimization objective of minimizing 
the cumulative weighted fraction of unsupplied demand and constraints of demand, supply, 
interdependency, restoration rates of the nodes, work crews available for restoring the network(s) 
among others.  
1.3 Workflow 
In this section, the basic work flow followed in achieving the objective is discussed. Firstly, a case-
study of the system of interdependent water, gas, and power utilities in Shelby County, TN, is 
chosen for the research. An optimization code is modelled with the objective of minimizing the 
cumulative weighted fraction of unsupplied demand (discussed in Section 3.1.4) and constraints 
involving demand, supply, interdependency, restoration rates of the nodes, work crews available 
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for restoring the network(s), interdiction of elements of the network such as nodes and links and 
many others (discussed in Section 3.1.6). Then, a modification is made to this optimization code 
such that the model is executed multiple times and node attack information, node restoration rate 
information and the time taken for the network to restore is stored in the form of data frame. The 






The concept of interdiction on a network can be compared to a situation where a network (for e.g., 
a city) is interdicted (i.e., attacked) due to a natural disaster or a human-made attack that makes 
the network unstable or inefficient.  Thus, being able to analyze the network’s performance after 
an interdiction (which might cause damage to some of its elements) occurs is a way to be able to 
take precautionary measures. Predicting the time taken for the network to recover completely is 
one of the analysis that should be considered. 
This section explains the background of machine learning and how it has been used in the field of 
networks and optimization. Optimization and Machine Learning are the two main concepts this 
work is built on. While optimization is concerned with exact solutions, machine learning is 
concerned with generalization abilities of learners (Munoz, 2014). Recently, machine learning has 
been used in every possible field to leverage its amazing power (Wang et al., 2018). Security is 
one of the main concerns facing the development of new projects in networking and 
communications. Another challenge is to verify that a system is working exactly as specified. On 
the other hand, advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology have opened new markets and 
opportunities for progress in critical areas such as network resiliency, health, education, energy, 
economic inclusion, social welfare, and the environment (Hussein et al., 2018). In this study, the 
focus is on the network resiliency, mainly on the time taken or the speed of the network’s recovery 
after an interdiction occurs.  By combining optimization techniques and machine learning 






In this section the methodology followed to implement the idea of building a model that will 
predict the time taken by our inter-dependent network after a disruptive event is discussed. 
It is achieved in 3 steps, the first being developing an optimization code that will select a set of 
nodes from the network that are being disrupted and reduce the recovery time. Second step is 
generating data by running the optimization code multiple times for random nodes being disrupted 
each time and observing the time taken (in seconds) for the network to recover completely. The 
final step is building different predictive models by training the data (train data set) generated and 
testing it with the test data set. The predictive models’ results are then compared.  
3.1. Optimization code 
The optimization model used in this work is an extension of the work from (Ghorbani Renani, et 
al., 2019). Hence the model’s notations, parameters and assumptions are taken directly form the 
source. The only  
3.1.1. Network description and representation 
For this research, we present a case-study of the system of interdependent water, gas, and power 
utilities in Shelby County, TN, USA. Figure 2 shows the general illustration of (a) the water, (b) 
gas, and (c) power networks individually, along with (d) their superposition (adapted from 




Figure 2. General depiction of the (a) water, (b) gas, and (c) power networks, and (d) the interdependency 
among networks in Shelby County, TN (adapted from González et al. (2016)). 
This model considers the physical interdependency for networks (mentioned in Section 3.1.2) in 
which the functionality of a set of nodes in one or more networks enable the functionality of a 
node in another network. In this case study, the power is dependent on the water network, which 
enables cooling in the power network (Zhang et al., 2016). The interdependent system of networks 
consists of 125 nodes and 164 links. 
Table 1. presents the general structure of the network components particularly in this study. In the 
water network, storage tanks and water pumps represent demand and supply nodes, respectively, 
and water pipelines are considered as the links. For the power network, substations are demand 
nodes, and gate stations are supply nodes, where the power transmission lines are the links. For 
the gas network, pipelines and gas distribution stations represent links and nodes, respectively. 
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Table 1. General formation of the water, gas, and power networks components in Shelby County, TN. 
(adapted from (Ghorbani Renani et al., 2019)) 
Network Nodes Supply nodes Demand nodes Links 
Water 49 34 15 71 
Gas 16 3 13 17 
Power 60 37 9 76 
 
From figures 3, 4 & 5 show the water, gas and power networks represented with links. The size of 
the nodes is directly proportional to the degree and the color codes are as follows, blue represents 
water, green represents gas, red represents power and the grey is used for nodes with degree >= 4 


















3.1.2. Model assumptions 
The proposed optimization model has the following underlying assumptions associated with the 
structure and operation of the system of networks and their interdependencies, and recovery, 
among others.  
- Each infrastructure network consists of a set of nodes (including supply, demand and 
transshipment nodes) connected by a set of links, such that each supply node, demand node, 
and link have known supply capacity, demand, and flow capacity, respectively. 
- There are work crews (work groups) responsible for repairing disrupted components in 
each infrastructure network, and this number can vary by network.  
- A work crew can only work on a single disrupted component at a time. A disrupted 
component can be restored by a single work crew (once the disrupted component is 
assigned to them) until they become operational.  
- There is a known restoration rate for each component, 𝜆, representing the proportion of the 
component restoration per unit time by each work crew. 
- Restoration time for each disrupted component is a function of both its failure and its 
restoration rate, both of which can vary by component.  
- Infrastructure networks are physically interdependent such that every “parent” node must 
be operational for the dependent “child” nodes to be operational. 
 
3.1.3. Notation 
An undirected network is denoted by 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐴), where 𝑁 is the set of nodes, and 𝐴 is the set of 
links. Assume a set 𝐾 of networks, each with a set of nodes 𝑁𝑘 such that ⋃ 𝑁𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 = 𝑁 and set of 
links 𝐴𝑘 such that ⋃ 𝐴𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 = 𝐴. Nodes can consist of supply nodes (𝑁𝑠
𝑘 ⊆ 𝑁𝑘), demand nodes 
(𝑁𝑑
𝑘 ⊆ 𝑁𝑘) and transshipment nodes (𝑁𝑘\ {𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , 𝑁𝑠
𝑘}) such that 𝑁𝑠
𝑘 ∩ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 = ∅. Sets 𝑁′𝑘 ⊆ 𝑁𝑘 and 
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𝐴′𝑘 ⊆ 𝐴𝑘 are candidate nodes and links, respectively, in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, that can be interdicted or 
protected in the system of interdependent networks. Note that this model considers a single 
commodity flowing through each network, but it could be easily extended to a multicommodity 
model. 𝛹 represents interdependency among networks such that ((𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?)) ∈ 𝛹 denotes node 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 physically depends on node 𝑖̅ ∈ 𝑁?̅? in network ?̅? ∈ 𝐾 where 𝑁𝑘 ∩ 𝑁?̅? =
∅, 𝐴𝑘 ∩ 𝐴?̅? = ∅ and ∀ 𝑘, ?̅? ∈ 𝐾: 𝑘 ≠ ?̅?. Set 𝑅𝑘 represents the available work crews in network 𝑘 ∈
𝐾. Index 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 provides the set of available time periods. Table 2 and  
Table 3 outline the model parameters and decision variables, respectively.  
Table 2. Model parameters. 
𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑘  Flow reaching node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 before the attack 
𝑤𝑖
𝑘 Importance weight assigned to node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
𝑆𝑖
𝑘 Amount of supply in node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑠
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
𝑑𝑖
𝑘 Amount of demand in node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  
𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘  Capacity of link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
𝜆𝑖𝑗
𝑘  Restoration rate of the link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  
𝜆𝑖
𝑘 Restoration rate of the node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  
Ε An arbitrarily small positive number, 0 < 𝜀 < 1 
𝑀 An arbitrarily large positive number 
 
Table 3. Model decision variables. 
𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑘  Amount of demand met at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, continuous 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  Flow on link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 in time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, continous 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘  Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is protected, binary   
𝑦𝑖




𝑘  Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is interdicted, binary 
𝑧𝑖
𝑘 Equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is interdicted, binary  
𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is disrupted, binary  
𝐹𝑖
𝑘 Equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is disrupted, binary 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑘  Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is operational, binary  
𝛼𝑖
𝑘 Equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is operational, binary  
𝛼′𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑟
 Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is restored by work crew 𝑟 ∈  𝑅𝑘  in time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, binary 
𝛼′𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑟
 Equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is restored by work crew 𝑟 ∈  𝑅𝑘  in time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, binary 
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  Equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is reactivated at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, binary 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘  Equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is reactivated at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, binary 
 
3.1.4 Objective function 
In particular, the model aims to minimize the (weighted) fraction of unsupplied demand over the 
planning horizon. For this purpose, let us define 𝜁(𝑡) as the weighted proportion of unmet demand 
(relative to the met demand before the disruption) at time 𝑡, as shown in Eq. (1), where 𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑘  
represents demand being met at node 𝑖 in network 𝑘 at time 𝑡, 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑘  represents the amount of demand 
met prior to the disruption at time 𝑡𝑒 (from Figure 1), and 𝑤𝑖
𝑘 is the relative importance of node 𝑖 
in network 𝑘. As mentioned in Section 1, network performance at time 𝑡 is represented with 𝜑(𝑡) 
















Then, the proposed objective function, which seeks to minimize the cumulative weighted fraction 
of unsupplied demand over the planning horizon for the worst-case disruption scenario, would be 








Constraints (3)-(6) present the nature of the first and second level decision variables. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∈ {0,1}      ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (3) 
𝑦𝑖
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (4) 
𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (5) 
𝑧𝑖
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (6) 
 
3.1.6. Restoration Level 
This level of the model is related to the second defender actions to plan the restoration of 
interdicted components. In this level, the failure of each disrupted component and its operationality 
status is determined for the recovery process. Flow balance constraints enable decision variables 
in this restoration level to connect with the objective function. Therefore, restoration scheduling is 
automatically set to return the system of networks to a stable operation as rapidly as possible.  
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The restrictions associated with the restoration level comprise constraints (3)-(44). Constraints (3) 
and (4) generally deliver failure status for candidate links 𝐴′𝑘 ⊆ 𝐴𝑘 and candidate nodes 𝑁′𝑘 ⊆
𝑁𝑘 respectively, depending on the protection and interdiction strategies. Constraints (5)-(8) 
determine the operationality status of each link and node based on their failure, where the binary 
variable 𝛼 is 1 when its associated link or node is operational (either protected or not interdicted) 
after the disruption. Constraints (9) and (10) ensure that operational links and nodes, respectively, 
are not restored. Constraints (11) and (12) state that nonoperational links and nodes cannot be 
functional at period 1, since they require at least one time unit to be reactivated. Constraints (13)-
(16) represent the flow balance constraints at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘  in infrastructure network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at time 
𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. Constraints (17) represent the capacity restriction for each link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑘. Constraints (18)-
(20) ensure that a positive flow through any given link can be attained at a period 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 only if 
such a link, along with its starting and ending nodes, are operational or were already recovered. 
Constraints (21) ensure that the restoration task of a disrupted link is continued without 
interruption once it has commenced. Likewise, constraints (24) accomplish this for a disrupted 
node. Constraints (22) and (23) calculate the total time that a specific work crew should be assigned 
to restore a nonoperational link. Note that constraints (22) and (23) together help to deliver integer 
value for the total required recovery time of an element. Similarly, constraints (25) and (26) 
calculate this time for a nonoperational disrupted node. Constraints (27) and (28) ensure that once 
the nonoperational disrupted link and node, respectively, are fully restored at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, they are 
labeled reactivated from the next period (𝑡 + 1 ∈ 𝑇) to the end of the time horizon of the model. 
Constraints (29) ensure that once the restoration of a disrupted link commences by a work crew at 
time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, that specific work crew completes restoration of that link. Similarly, constraints (30) 
accomplish this same restriction for the disrupted nodes. Constraints (31) and (32) state that, at the 
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given time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, only one work crew can work on the restoration task of a specific nonoperational 
disrupted link or node, respectively. Constraints (33) ensure that, at the given time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, only one 
nonoperational disrupted component can be restored by a given work crew. Constraints (34) 
establish the interdependency among networks, ensuring that the positive flow through a link can 
be only available if their corresponding related parent nodes (in other networks) are operational. 
Finally, constraints (35)-(44) represent the nature of the decision variables for the restoration level. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + (1 − 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) =  1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (3) 
𝑦𝑖
𝑘 + (1 − 𝑧𝑖
𝑘) (1 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑘) =  1 − 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (4) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (5) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≥ 𝜀 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (6) 
𝛼𝑖
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (7) 
𝛼𝑖
𝑘 + 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ≥ 𝜀 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (8) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  (9) 
𝛼𝑖
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (10) 
𝛽𝑖𝑗1
𝑘 = 0 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (11) 
𝛽𝑖1










𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑠







= 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘\ {𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , 𝑁𝑠








𝑘  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (15) 
𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ≤ 𝑑𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (16) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 ≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗

















































𝑘 + 1) +𝑀𝛼𝑖𝑗




































𝑘 + 1) +𝑀𝛼𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (26) 









𝑘  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 | 𝑡 ≠ 1, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (27) 
















≤  𝑀(1 − 𝛼′𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑟
) 







≤  𝑀(1 − 𝛼′𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑟
) 

























∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘, ?̅? ∈ 𝐾 , ∀ 𝑖̅
∈ 𝑁′?̅? | ((𝑖 , 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?)) ∈ 𝛹  
𝑜𝑟 ((𝑗 , 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?)) ∈ 𝛹, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  
(34) 
𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (35) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑘  , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (36) 
𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (37) 
𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (38) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (39) 
𝛼𝑖
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (40) 
𝛼′𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑟
∈ {0,1} ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀ 𝑟 ∈  𝑅𝑘 (41) 
𝛼′𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑟
∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀ 𝑟 ∈  𝑅𝑘 (42) 
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (43) 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (44) 
 
Before implementing the proposed solution algorithm, nonlinear constraints (3), (4), (27), and (28) 
are linearized. To linearize constraints (3) and (4), we define three different sets of linear 





𝑘 + (1 − 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) + 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≥ 1 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (45) 
𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (46) 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴′𝑘  , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (47) 
Similarly, constraint (4) can be replaced by constraints (48)-(50). 
𝑦𝑖
𝑘 + (1 − 𝑧𝑖
𝑘) + 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ≥ 1 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (48) 
𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ≤ 𝑧𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (49) 
𝑦𝑖
𝑘 ≤ 1 − 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (50) 
 
Finally, by adopting the big-𝑀 method (Taha, 1998), constraints (27) and (28) can be replaced by 







































𝑘  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 | 𝑡 ≠ 1, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (52) 
 
Parameter 𝑀 in constraints (21)-(26) and (51)-(52) only needs to be greater than the maximum 
required time for restoring the disrupted components. 
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3.2 Data generation 
3.2.1 Understanding the data of Approach I 
The optimization model is modified to run multiple times and each time the nodes attacked are 
randomized and the restoration rates for each node are also randomized mostly between [0.7-0.99]. 
The time taken for the restoration of the entire network is also noted. As  mentioned earlier the 
total number of nodes in the network are 125, (water network – 49, gas network – 16 and power 
network – 60), each row in the data consists of 251 data cells, that is 125 cells with nodes’ data of 
whether a node is attacked (represented by 1) and or not (represented by 0), 125 cells of restoration 
rates of these nodes in the same order and the last cell represents the time for  total restoration of 
the network. Below is a table of how the data set of size n*251 looks.  
 
 
Table 4. Template of the data generated from the optimization code. 
Node1 Node2 … Node125 Rest_rate1 Rest_rate2 … Rest_rate125 Time 
Row 1         
Row 2         
…         
Row n         
 
The column names used are in the format: nwx_ny that represents network x node y. So, the 
column names are as follows, nw1_n1 to nw1_n49 for network 1 (that is the water network), 
nw2_n1 to nw2_n16 for network 2 (that is the gas network), nw3_n1 to nw3_n60 for network 3 
22 
 
(that is the power network). Similarly, for the columns with restoration rates, rr_nwx_ny represents 
the restoration rate for node y of network x. The snaps of the actual data are shown below. 
The entire data set can be found at https://sooners-
my.sharepoint.com/:f:/g/personal/ghaneshvar_ou_edu/EocFD7mhoEpEtMVVyBNsicYBIlHk24
Q54mHEOF5wl01RTA?e=YUeYXQ in the folder Data > Original Data. 
Table 5. An extract of the data generated with the status of the nodes. 
nw1_n1 nw1_n2 nw1_n3 nw1_n4 nw1_n5 nw1_n6 nw1_n7 nw1_n8 nw1_n9 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 























0.81 0.77 0.73 0.82 0.75 0.84 0.7 0.7 9 
0.91 0.76 0.86 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.91 0.82 29 
0.87 0.82 0.92 0.91 0.8 0.97 0.93 0.94 17 
0.82 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.97 33 
0.8 0.83 0.73 0.88 0.75 0.85 0.71 0.77 9 
0.63 0.53 0.7 0.74 0.51 0.56 0.72 0.59 11 
0.74 0.94 0.66 0.83 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.91 9 
0.74 0.84 0.73 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.7 0.8 9 
0.79 0.89 0.89 0.77 0.86 0.75 0.81 0.76 15 
0.94 0.88 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.82 0.88 0.87 23 
0.75 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.75 0.83 29 
0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.9 23 
0.76 0.8 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.85 0.94 25 
0.85 0.83 0.87 0.78 0.86 0.72 0.7 0.82 11 
0.37 0.21 0.46 0.33 0.44 0.33 0.49 0.39 7 
0.76 0.82 0.7 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.77 0.89 13 
0.85 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.84 0.88 35 
0.28 0.47 0.47 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.24 0.48 10 
0.65 0.83 0.62 0.72 0.61 0.88 0.73 0.64 13 
0.76 0.78 0.75 0.89 0.81 0.76 0.87 0.84 9 
0.81 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.7 0.82 0.79 27 
0.7 0.75 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.87 0.81 13 
0.88 0.85 0.74 0.74 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.76 11 
0.88 0.83 0.87 0.71 0.8 0.88 0.84 0.71 7 
0.87 0.76 0.8 0.77 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.84 21 
0.84 0.75 0.72 0.8 0.85 0.79 0.78 0.81 9 
0.86 0.75 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.94 0.87 0.84 21 
 
Now investigating the distribution of number of nodes attacked (for the 10,000 iterations 














Figure 7. Screenshot of one of the frames of the GIF created for the power network. 
  
To represent the randomness of the nodes selected for being attacked, GIFs were created from 100 
iterations selected at random from the data set, as shown in figure 9. The gray color indicate that 




3.2.2 Addition of features, extension of Approach I 
A few features were added to the existing data as a part of feature engineering. These features 
include 3 columns that represent the total number of nodes attacked in water, gas and power 
networks individually and these columns are named as ‘total_nw1’, ‘total_nw2’ and ‘total_nw3’ 
respectively. A column that represents the total number of nodes attacked in the whole network is 
also added and named as ‘total’. Addition of these four features improved the prediction accuracy 
and the comparison for one of the predictive methods is discussed in Section 4. 
3.2.3 Approach II 
Hence, an alternate method was thought of and implemented. This method includes formatting of 
the data obtained from the optimization code. It includes the multiplication of the first 125 columns 
with the next 125 columns, that is the AND product of the node attack data and the restoration rate 
data of the respective columns. The time column remains unchanged. This results in a data set with 
126 columns having restoration rate of an attacked nodes and zero otherwise, with last column still 
representing time. The entire data set can be found at https://sooners-
my.sharepoint.com/:f:/g/personal/ghaneshvar_ou_edu/EocFD7mhoEpEtMVVyBNsicYBIlHk24
Q54mHEOF5wl01RTA?e=YUeYXQ in the folder Data > Formatted Data. 
This approach helps n keeping only the relevant data required for the prediction, that is the 
restoration rates of only the nodes attacked and the rest are zeros. An advantage of using this 
approach is that the computational time taken to train the dataset obtained is considerably reduced, 
as the dataset size is reduced by half (from 251 columns to 126 columns). As the size of the train 
dataset is only 7,000 rows, the time difference between training the datasets from approach I and 
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approach II is in seconds. When larger datasets are trained, the time difference could be in hours 
or days. 
 
Table 7. An extract of the dataset after formatting. 
nw3_n53 nw3_n54 nw3_n55 nw3_n56 nw3_n57 nw3_n58 nw3_n59 nw3_n60 time 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
0 0.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 
0 0 0 0 0 0.97 0 0 17 
0.82 0 0 0.84 0 0 0.92 0 33 
0 0 0 0 0 0.85 0 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
0 0 0 0 0.77 0 0 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.76 15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 
0.75 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0 29 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 
0 0.8 0 0 0.9 0 0.85 0 25 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
0 0.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0 0 0 0.93 0 0.97 0 0 35 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.64 13 
0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.81 13 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
0.87 0 0 0 0 0.78 0.85 0 21 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
0.84 0 0.89 0 0 0 0 0 33 
0 0 0 0 0.84 0 0 0 11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.85 0 29 





As observed from the above histogram d) of figure 8, the maximum number of nodes attacked in 
the network is 40 (Figure, d)). This is because of the computational limits of the software package 
used to solve the optimization model, Gurobi. In order to increase the number of nodes considered 
to be attacked, the possible time required for the network (which is a parameter used in the code) 
to restore should also be increased. This increases the computational time exponentially. For 
example, keeping the possible time taken to restore to 75 seconds and the number of nodes attacked 
to 50 could possibly take more than 24 hours to execute just one iteration. Hence keeping in mind, 
the time constraint, maximum number of nodes attacked were restricted to 40. 
Proportion of the number of rows of the data generated to the total possible combinations of the 
number of nodes attacked is almost 0. This is because there are 125 nodes and even with the 
consideration of fixing the number attacked nodes to 25 (out of 125), the total combinations are 
1.3*1026 (nCr = 
125C25), which is a huge number. The total number of unique combinations (rows) 
possible would be 2125 = 4.2*1037. Whereas the size (rows) of the data generated is 10,000. Thus, 
the ratio is very minimal and hence a very small portion of the combinations are considered (at 
random) for the analysis. The time taken to create 10,000 rows of data is around 12 days.  
 
3.3 Predictive modelling 
For the predictive analysis, a data set of 10,000 rows and 251 columns (as described above) is 




Four different models were used to predict the time taken for the network to restore, namely, 
Random Forest Model, Gradient Boosting Model, Linear Model and Decision Trees Model. The 
predicted time values are the compared with actual values and the RMSE (root mean square error) 
and correlation are compared. RStudio software was used to make the predictive analysis and 





4.1 Discussion of approach I 
On comparing the prediction results and validating (RMSE and correlation values) them with test 
data made using the Random Forest technique applied on the original data and the data after the 
addition of the 4 features (discussed in Section 3.2.2) produced from the optimization code, the 
following observation is made. The train dataset consists of 7,000 rows and the test data set consists 
of 3,000 rows. 
Table 8. Comparison of RMSE and correlation for Random Forest model. 
 Before feature engineering After feature engineering 
RMSE value 4.92 1.05 
Correlation 0.81 0.99 
 
Comparing and analyzing the four different predictive models, namely Random Forest, Gradient 




Figure 8. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and Decision Tree for 
the original data. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and Decision Tree after 
the addition of the four features. 
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It can be observed that there is clear improvement in the RMSE and correlation values of the 
prediction of time before and after adding the features. 
An analysis was made on how the addition of the four features (representing the number of nodes 
attacked) impacted the predictions and it was observed that these features alone were able to 
predict with a correlation of 0.95 (for the Random Forest model). This was because of high 
restoration rates of the nodes that were produced randomly were limited mostly between 0.7 and 
0.99. This means that all the nodes that fall under these restoration rates (0.5-0.99) take 2 seconds 
to recover (as 1/0.5 = 2 seconds and 1/0.99 = 1.01 ≈ 2 seconds). Thus, most of the nodes were 
assigned a restoration rate that results in 2 seconds to be repaired or restored. In that way the 
addition of features affects the prediction and do not help us in providing a value that is dependable 
despite having high accuracy. 
4.2 Discussion of approach II 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of the models: Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Linear Model and Decision Tree for 
the formatted data. 
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This data generated using approach II was used for similar analysis and the results are compared 
as shown in figure 13. 
 
4.3 Comparison of approach I & II 
Table 9 shows the comparison of the three different data sets used for the predictive analysis. 
Table 9. Comparison of the results 




After data formatting 
(Approach II) 
Random Forest RMSE = 4.94 
Correlation = 0.81 
RMSE = 0.98 
Correlation = 0.99 
RMSE = 4.34 
Correlation = 0.88 
Gradient Boosting RMSE = 3.23 
Correlation = 0.92 
RMSE = 1.25 
Correlation = 0.99 
RMSE = 3.54 
Correlation = 0.90 
Linear Model RMSE = 2.36 
Correlation = 0.95 
RMSE = 2.36  
Correlation = 0.95 
RMSE = 3.75 
Correlation = 0.88 
Decision Tree RMSE = 6.70 
Correlation = 0.54 
RMSE = 2.45 
Correlation = 0.95 
RMSE = 6.91 
Correlation = 0.49 
 
Comparing the original data (blue) and formatted data (green) predictions from Table 9, it is 
observed that the prediction from Random Forest model is better for the formatted data. Whereas 








It is important to know how resilient a system is as it defines the strength of the system to recover 
to its original functioning state and can be used as a method of assessing how strong it is towards 
a disruptive event. From resilience point of view, time taken by a system to recover from a 
disruptive event is one of the measures of evaluating the system’s performance. This assessment 
can be used in taking precautionary measures towards the safety of the system. 
The objective of this research is to be able to predict the time taken for the interdependent network 
to recover completely from an interdiction of a set randomly selected nodes. This is done by 
training the data obtained from an optimization model, whose objective is to minimize the recovery 
time given supply, demand, restoration rates and other constraints. The validation is made by 
comparing the prediction results of the test data. 
In order to implement this concept, we present a case study based on the interdependent network 
consisting of water, gas, and power networks in Shelby County, TN, USA. The results show the 
predicted time taken for the network to recover completely to its original state and the comparison 
of the results obtained from different models used for the prediction. 
From the comparison Table 9, it can be observed that the predictions for the data set with the 
addition of the four features (highlighted in yellow) are highly correlative compared to the 
predictions for original data (blue) and the formatted data (green). Meaning these four columns are 
dominating the prediction process due the restoration rate limitations as discussed in Section 4.1. 
Thus, these prediction results (in yellow) representing the data after feature engineering cannot be 
considered for comparison for this work. 
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Comparison of the predictions of approach I (blue) and approach II (green) from Table 9, shows 
that the prediction from Random Forest model is better for the formatted data, that is approach II. 
Whereas for rest of the models, Gradient Boosting, Linear model and Decision Tree the approach 
I yields better prediction. 
Compelling conclusions cannot be made on which approach among approach I or approach II is 
better, or which predictive modelling gives better results compared to others as the dataset 
generated and used for training and predicting is only a very tiny fraction of what can be produced 
without limitations and hence the conclusions made on the results obtained are not substantial. But 
the objective of predicting the time taken for the network to recover is achieved and the validation 





6. FUTURE SCOPE 
Due to the time and software constraints, the depth of the research was limited. The directions in 
which this work can be explored in a broader way is discussed in this section. The future work can 
be explored on the following: 
• Focusing on the size of the data used for the analysis, bigger the data size, more the 
reliability of the analysis. 
• Increasing the number of nodes considered to be attacked or interdicted (discussed in 
Section 3.2.3) will provide a data set that is less sparse when compared to lesser nodes 
considered. 
• Decreasing the of restoration rates of the nodes, that is considering the nodes take long 
time to restore, for example consider a node with a restoration rate of 0.12, the node will 
need 1/0.12 = 8.3 ≈ 9 seconds to recover. This ensures the range of the time taken for the 
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